The British Occupation of Egypt. by Elgood, P. G., C.M.G.
THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT
L!Y LIKUTKiXANT COLONKI. I'. G. ELGOOO, C.M.G.
FR'E HUNDRED years before the birth of Christ, Cambyses
the Persian swept across Sinai and planted his standard in Mem-
phis and Thebes. It was the entl (jf the Pharaonic Empire, and from
the calamity Egypt did not wholly recover. One invader has suc-
ceeded another and the tale is not yet complete. For twenty cen-
turies and more, Egypt has been the victim of con(iuest and satrapy.
The French occupation ( 1798- 180 P) was a turning point in
the historv of Egypt. It gave a fresh lease of life to Turkish sover-
eignty, but it also ])roduce(l a man in Mohammed Ali, who laid the
foundation of Egypt's present prosperity. lUit his government was
too personal, too arbitrary to outlive his times : nor did it do so,
as subsequent history testifies. Of Abbas, a grandson, and Said,
a son, little need be said, but Ismail, another grandson, who as-
cended the throne in 1863, requires longer mention. About his
memory so many stories revoh'e that the true is not easy to separ-
ate from the false, ^'et this much is certain : during his short reign
of sixteen years he brought l\gypt to the brink of beggary. At his
accession the public debt stood at £ E. 3,000,000 ; at his al)dication
it amounted to £ \\. 100,000,000, and for the major part of that
formidable total there was little to show. The countr\' could well
afford to support its ruler's whims in the beginning. AVar was rag-
ing in the Fruited States and the spinners of luirope were paying
fabulous sums for Egyptian cottcn. Then the golden harvest dried
up, and Ismail began to borrow at ruinous discounts or rates of in-
terest. Two instances will suffice. Out of a nominal loan of £ E.
32.000,000 floated in 1873. Egypt received £ E. 11,000,000 in cash
and £ E. 9,000,000 in depreciated script, and for the accommodation
paid in annual interest £ M. 2,156.000. At another moment in re-
turn for a cash advance of £ E. 72,000, the sovereign handed ever
£ E. 230,000 of E'gyptian stocks. Finance of this type carries its
own penalty, and in midsuiumer 1875 the borrowing came to an
abrupt end. Alarmed at Ismail's personal extravagance, European
bankers would lend no mere. In despair he offered to a syndicate in
Paris the 177,000 shares subscril)ed by his predecessor to the Suez
Canal Company: but doubtful of the value of the security, the syn-
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dicate hesitated, and getting- wind of the negotiations, Disraeli on
behalf of luigland bought the shares for £ E. 4,000,000. Hitherto
the domestic concerns of Kgypt had been of no ])articular interest
to England. If investors chose to speculate in Egyi)tian securities,
it was their concern and not that of the Cabinet. I'ut ])artnership
in the Suez Canal altered this |)oint <;f \iew : England no less than
h'ranee thenceforth was directl\ interested in the maintenance nf
stable gcjvernment in b'gyjit. None the less, Disraeli had no inten-
tion of embarking ujxn an\- ad\enti-re in that country, and to Ismail's
protests of solvency he turned a deaf ear. ddie end came in June.
187^), when the Sultan of Turkev. pushed bv b'.ngiand antl b^rance,
ft reed him to abdicate. IsuKiil could hardl\- com])lain of the fate
that had o\ertaken him. I lis wilfulness and extraxagance had well
nigh ruined I'-g>"i)t, and jjosteritv will remember him more kindly
for his creation of the Mixed Courts.
Tewfik, his son, succeeded. The new reign began inauspiciously
with low Xiles, poor harvests and epidemics which took toll of man
and beast. Under the strain Egypt bent, and sought in wain for
relief. It was not to be found. England and b^rance, endeavoring
to ward off bankruptcy, had succeeded in promulgating a law of
liciuidation (1880) that lightened part of b'gy])t's heavy burden,
but taxation was still intolerably high and justice seldom obtain-
able. Tewfik, a simple-minded and frugal man, was no ruler to
ride the storm, and matters went from bad to worse. In their
plight the peo])le turned to Islam for comfort, and al-Azhar. the
seminary of Islamic lore, in return whispered of the need of brother-
hood of Moslems. C)ut of the wild talk of Alims and sheikhs, there
sprang u]) a hatred of E^uropeans. and a belief that their interfer-
ence in the affairs of I^gyi)t was at the root of her ills. I'nder these
infiuences a crudely national parly came into existence, that planned
to dethrone the sovereign and establish a rciiublic. Eed bv Arabi.
the army was the first to show its hand. Alilitary grievances were
numerous and legitimate enough, but Tewfik did not handle the
business well, bfe accei)ted a national ministrw gave .Vrabi the
portfolio of war. It was a rash exjK^riment. and the new minister
took e\'ery advantage of his authority. There seemed no alternative
l)Ut intervention, yet England in ]xirticular hung back. She had
joined Erance in a dual control d Egy])tian finance without en-
thusiasm, she had held aloof from the commission of public debt.
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she had refused to nominate an Enghshman to supervise collection
of Egyptian revenue. She had never coveted possession of Egypt,
she did not desire it now.
In the end many unoffending Europeans lost their lives in the
tumultous days of June, 1882. The ])atience of the British ad-
miral gave way: getting no answer to his letters of remonstrance,
he opened fire on the forts of Alexandria July 11. France did not
participate. Her commitments in northern Africa were already
heav\". and she was reluctant to add to them. It Avas thus left to
England to fulfill the Anglo-Erench promise to support the author-
itv of the throne. ^lilitary operations succeeded naval: news of
Arahi's intention to destroy the Suez Canal transferred the campaign
from Alexandria to Ismailia. The British and Egyptian forces met
at Tel el Kehir on the 10th of Septemher in an engagement ending
in the rout of the latter and the capitulation of Cairo. Thus hegan
an occupation, which continues to this day.
In a sense England had accomplished her mission. Order had
been restored, Arabi and his confederates were prisoners of war:
there seemed no great reason to retain a garrison in Egypt. But
decision was not so simple as that : the future would remain doubt-
ful, until the worst of Egypt's grievances had been redressed. They
were legitimate and manifold, and an impartial survey of Egyptian
conditions in the autumn of 1882 justified the impression that abuse
of authorit\' was at the bottom of the evil. 1die throne itself was the
worst oft'ender : its word was law, its prerogative was illimitable.
It imposed burdens upon the people b}- sim])le decree, it drew no
distinction between national revenue and the civil list. The inci-
dence of taxation was painfull\- imperfect: the heavier burden fell
upon the wretched peasant. The kurbash and the prison were the
twin pillars of the administration, and ]~)rovincial authority used
both mercilessly. Crime also was rife: no man's life or property
was safe in a country were brigandage and blackmail marched hand
in hand. X'arious deoartments of the State needed reconstruction:
everywhere corruption and indolence reigned supreme. Irrigation
was in deplorable straits. Incompetent engineers wasted the valu-
able summer water, neglected to keep in repair public works. The
barrage. Mohammed All's great conception, at the apex of the Delta,
stood unusable : its foundation had subsided, its piers were cracked.
Military service was another affliction. Pay was generally in ar-
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rears, the term of eno^agcment illegally extended, the ration issue
insufficient. Robbed and maltreated, conscripts deserted right and
left. Xo less oppressive was the corz'cc or system of forced labor.
which swept the countryside clear of able-bodied fellahin in order
to ccnstruct works fre(juently of questionable utility and to cleat
canals and drains for the lienetit of wealthy landowners.
Hesitatingly the British cabinet reached four conclusions: first,
that a peaceful Egypt depended ujion the removal of grievances ;
secondly, that reconstruction of the administratimi aloue could re-
move the grievances ; thirdly, that England would indicate the
method of reconstruction : and lastly, that British troops must re-
main in Egypt until the task was accomplished. There had never
been talk of annexation or of prolonging occupation once stability
was assured. Lord DulTerin as special High Commissioner came to
Cairo to lay the foundations of constitutional government. His mis
sion went no further than a modest experiment in organic law
he was to maintain the throne with a drastic restriction of its
former prerogatives. Xo new tax in future was to be imposed
without consent of a General Assemblv, no new measures could
become law until a Legislative Council had debated it. It was
Egypt's first introduction to rei)resentative go\-ernment.
Meanwhile Europe was divided. Germany, Italv, and Austria
saw nothing unreasonable in England's programme : b>ance and
Turkey hotly contested it. The indignation of France was natural,
but illogical. LTaving refused to cooperate in the disagreeable lousi-
ness of intervention, she was not in a position to com]:)lain. She
vented her annoyance in pressing England to specify the date of the
army of occupation's departure : a (irestion that the British Cabinet
would only answer by the formula "as soon as the state of Egypt
permits." But conscience was pricking ]\Ir. Gladstone, the prime
minister. He was anxious to remain on good terms with France,
he was also desirous of relieving his country of the cost of main-
taining the army of occupation. Spurred by this reasoning he de-
cided to reduce the force in Egypt to the limit of a small garrison
in Alexandria as the first step toward evacuation.
However, before a soldier could movej orders were counter-
manded. The southern Sudan was ablaze with revolt. Isolated
Egyptian garrisons, making what terms they could, had capitulated
:
Khartoum, the capital, was in danger. Impressed by that menace.
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the Egyptian prime minister hastily conscripted 10,000 fellahin, and
bade their commander, General Hicks, stamp out the insurrection.
lUit Micks was tra])ped in the deserts of Kordofan, his travesty of
an arm\- wiped out. At once England pressed on Egypt the need
of evacuating Khartoimi while there was yet time : hut neither the
ruler nor his ministers would listen. "Let us talk of evacuation,"
said the prime minister testily, "when we've beaten these insolent
rebels." It was a vain boast, for Egypt had neither the troops nor
the money to undertake the reconquest of the Sudan, and England
declined to lend either. In the end Egypt gave way, and General
(iordon was selected to conduct the evacuation.
Throughout 1884 Lord Cromer, r)ritish agent and consul gener-
al, was patiently struggling with other embarrassments. Egypt was
confronted with £ E. 8,000,000 of pressing liabilities with no money
to give. Even the right to borrow had been denied. To meet emer-
gencies and provide money for current needs, Cromer convincing-
ly urged an immediate loan of £ E. *^,000,C00. To demonstrate their
complete disinterestedness in Egypt the British government in-
vited the cooperation of Europe, and the convention of London in
1885 gave Egypt a fresh start by placing £ E. 9,000.000 at her dis-
posal. At this i)oint England vaguely took stock of her responsibili-
ties in Egy]:it. They were growing a]iace, and she contemplated
transferring their burden to other shoulders. Turkey, the suzerain
Power, was the obvious alternative and was invited to take up the
task. The Sultan was very willing, and his representative, Muktar
Pasha, met Drummond Wolff in Cairo. But the two commissioners
could not agree. Muktar was for recon(|uering the Sudan as a
beginning. Wolff' for reform and retrenchment in Egypt. The
British cabinet then decided to negotiate directly with Constanti-
nople. Thev off'ered to withdraw all tr()Oi)s within three years, reserv-
ing onl\' right of rcoccui^atii n if circumstances re(|uired, and the
Sultan would ha\-e signed an agreement on those lines but for the
remonstrance of iM-ance and Russia. Mistakenly Turke}' listened to
the counsel, and her single opportunity of recovering control over
Egyipt ])assed.
Meanwhile Cmmer was endeavoring to make one ])iastre do
the work of two. The new loan provided £ E. 1,000,000 for develop-
ment, and there was little dcubt where the sum could be most profit-
ablv s])ent. b^gyptian prosperity springs from intensive agriculture.
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which in turn depends upon a punctual and adecjuate supply of sum-
mer water. To assure that elementary neetl Mohammed AH had
huilt his barrage, and to its reconstruction a little troop of British
engineers applied themselves. The distribution of water and clear-
ing cf canals had been handled from time immemorial, though never
very efficiently, by the corvee. Now a fresh dit^culty supervened.
Relieved from his fear of the kttrbasJi under the new administration,
the fellah ignored the summons of authority and stayed at home.
Cromer for once was puzzled. Despite des])airing cries from the
ministry, remonstrances from proviiicial authorities and appeals
from the land-owning classes, he would nut reintroduce the knrbaslr.
from lack of money he could not substitute paid labor. However,
by skimping and paring, Egypt contrived to iind the money from her
own resources, and in 1890 the corvcf was formally and finally
abolished. The outlook was then brightening. Bankruptcy no longer
stared Egypt in the face, the dead weight of the Sudan had been
lifted. A reserve fund had been created, and money was available
at last to recondition administrative services. But the ministries of
justice and interior were painfully in need of reform, and it was
onlv bv pointed reminders that in a conflict of wills the English
voice must triumph that the judiciar}- was reformed.
Tewfik died (January 7, 1892), and his son Abbas Hilmi sat on
the throne. A wayward youth impatient of counsel and restraint,
flattered and importuned by a court of parasites, he picked a quarrel
with England at once. To the sagacious Cromer the incident pointed
a moral. I^e had begun his work in the ex])ectation that the Egypt-
ian people under guidance would accomplish their own salvation: the
attitude of the throne and of its advisers caused him reluctantly to
put away that hope. Unless the process of reconstruction was quick-
ened, he was forced to admit that a century would be insufficient for
the task, and fortified with that belief he altered his ]:)rocedure.
Hitherto executive authority had l)een exercised by Egy])tians, and
ministers as the_\- thought fit followed (jr rejected counsel tended by
Englishmen. That was now changed. At the side of each minister
sat a British adviser, whose word was law : at the elbow of the
provincial mudir or governor was a British inspector armed with lit-
tle less authority. It was not ideal administration: it led in the end
to the exclusion of Egyptians from the more imp(jrtant offices of
their government. It hastened reconstruction, my doubt, but it also
left a distrust of England's intentions.
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Xonc the less, under it Egypt prospered. The Sudan was re-
conquered, the achiiinistration jxirged oi its grosser defects, and of
the many obstacles that had hindered regeneration, there remained
only the jealousy of I'^rance and the burden of the capitulations.
From the first days of the occu])ation hVance had hindered and
thwarted r)ritish jilans. less out of alTection fcr Egypt than from de-
sire to pay oti diplomatic scores elsewhere. But in 1904 the moment
seemed o])portune to come to an understanding: then France needed
liritish gocd-will in Morocco as much as England needed the good
offices of France in Egypt. Thus came about an Anglo-French dec-
laration, that left England a free hand in Egypt. The capitulations
were less easy to handle. I'nder them the foreigner escaped arbitrary
taxation and arrest, and treaty and tradition consecrated those ele-
mentary rights. lUit in the nineteenth century the burden had become
embarrassing: before ap]ilying either taxation or laws to the for-
eign community. Eg}pt had first to obtain consent of the fourteen
capitulatory Powers. It seemed to Cromer an archaic procedure, and
he proposed to substitute for the I^owers a local covmcil representa-
tive of resident foreigners.
The indignity of the proposal rankled : already wounded by a
convention (January 11, 18*J9), recognizing an Anglo-Egyptian con-
dominium in the Sudan, and Ijy I'^rance's acknowledgement of the
occu])ation, Egypt stirred imeasil}'. ( Hit of the resentment was born
a national ])artv led by ]\[ustapha Kamil, an inspiring personality,
whose fierce denunciation of the occu]:)ation found an echo in the
hearts of his fellow-countrymen. Abbas Hilmi patronized him,
sheikhs and notables hung ujjon his words. All Egypt was convulsed
with the struggle, but Cromer did not stay to see its conclusion. He
had written his last despatch, had spoken his last word, and in the
S})ring (^f I'^'O" he laid down his stewardship. It had been a memor-
able one : it had rescued Egypt from insolvency, it had planted the
seed of virtuous administration. Xo man had ever served her better.
England was now at the ]:)arting of the ways, uncertain whether
Eg^-pt would respond best to further Anglicization of the govern-
ment, or to a reversion to earlier ideals. Sir Eldcn Gorst, taking
Cromer's place, had no doubts : he indicated at once his intention
to curtail the power of advisers, to restore to ministers their old pre-
dominance in administration, to limit British influence in the civil
service. The policy worked admirably for a while : the throne cooper-
ated enthusiastically and a new prime minister 'in full sympathy with
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]{gy])tian as})irations took office. The natinnal ])artv began to disin-
tegrate. Tliere was a short strnggle for snpremacy l)et\veen it and
the cabinet, Ijut Mnstapha Kamil was dead, and his mantle had fallen
upon less capal)le men. Moslem and C"oi)t fell out: rival congresses
embittered the disjiute.
(lOrst did not live to enjoy the frrit of his labors: in l*'ll he
went heme to die. Criticism and comment ])ursued him to the grave.
With one \-oice the foreign community condemned his policv as i)re-
mature, and Europe agreed with the judgment, .\e\ertheless, he had
ploughed too deep for a successi r to disturb his work. ni:r did Lord
Kitchener attem])t to do so. That remarkable man was more con-
cerned in the betterment of agriculture than in the political aspira-
ti< ns of l{gvi!t, and he flung himself into its studv. There was, no
doubt, room for a vigorous hand. Cotton, the staple cro]). was de-
teriorating in (|ralit\' and in _\ield. due to inade([uate drainage, over-
])ro(lucti(.)n. and insect ]K\sts. Meanwhile, pi pulation was increasing
b\- leaps and bounds while th.e area of culti\able land remained sta-
tionary. Common sense bade Egypt in these circumstances to pre-
})are against a da\' when economic pressure would oblige the fellahin
to break A'irgin ground, and Kitchener cast an inciuiring eye upon
the extensi\e lakes and marshes that border the Mediterranean shore.
Their reclamation was an extensi\e undertaking, and Kitchener was
perha])s in too great a hurrv to succeed. I'.u.l if his execution was at
fault, his insight was true enough: l\g\'pt can ne\er ha\e a sut^-
ciency of cultivable land. Meanwhile there had arisen an insistent
crv for parliamentar\- control of the executi\'e. and reluctantly Kit-
chener turned fr( m agriculture to answer it. ( iorst's modest experi-
ments in organic law had whetted ]\g\ptian appetite for wider con-
cessions and Kitchener thought t(^ satisfy it l)y creating a single
legislature. in\ested with larger attributions Uian the two cham-
bers it dis})laced. lie was mistaken: nothing short of parliamentary
control would now i)lease Egy])t.
A\'ar arrested the reHexion : unexpectedly b^.gypt found herself
a i)arlicipant in the struggle. Turke}'. the suzerain Eower. entered
the lists, intent on blocking the Suez Canal. Military authorit}' in
Egypt ])roclaimed martial law. The news sh(jcked society. Martial
law had a sinister ncjte. a hint of actual hostilities by no means re-
lieved l)y a later understanding that England "undertook the sole bur-
den of the war w'.thout calling uijon the Egyptian people for aid
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therein."" It was a rash promise; tor no human intelligence could
])re(lict in l'*14 the course and consec]tiences of the World War.
\\\)rse was to follow. Peace had sufficiently indicated the anomal-
ies of a military occu])ation of h^j^ypt : war with donkey made their
continuance im])ossihle. A new form of e^o\ernment had to he de-
\ised, a new nationalitx" provided for the I\i^\ptian peo]:)le. Aiuiex-
ation and autonomy were considered and rejected: the tu'st was
certain to promote susjiicion amon^' neutral I'owers ; the second, to
increase difficulties in defending- the Stiez I'anal. I'etween the two
extremes stood a i)rotectorate : no yerv satisfactory alternatiye in
\iew of the earlier pled,ij;es _<^i\eu hy h'n^laud on the suhject of the
occupati; n, Ijut an ex])edient ])rol)al)ly less o])en to ohjection than
the others. ( )n the l*'th of l>eceml)er, l'U4, hjyeland annotuiced her
decision, and simultaneously inxited I'rince I lusein Kamel. sou of
Ismail, t(-i acccjjt the throne in i)lace of Ahhas llilmi. whose atti-
tude was suspect.
The Turkish attack on the canal failed dismally, hut for the
two years followiuf^ I'-g'^d'^ '^^'^ ^'* hear the inc: nyeniences incidental
to a state of war. They were at first light enout^h. hut in the sum-
mer of 1917 that comfortahle state of afifairs came to an end. Urit-
ish strategy called for an in\asion of Palestine, .\cross Sinai grew
tip a long line of communications, liefore ( iaza there lay a field
army needing labor and produce. P^:>r awhile lygyr)t |)rovi(led both
uncomplainingly: then the supply dwindled and military authority
was forced to refjuisition. Cro]:)s and animals were seized, labor
was compulsorilv recruited: a melancholy comment upon England's
undertaking in 1*^14. Xone the less from the war Eg}'pt {)rotited
materially. 1 ler revenue exceeded expenditure, her financial re-
serye increased. She had been saved from invasion, she had few
dead to moiu-n. Agriculture had prospered. Tier savings ]M-obabl\'
amounted to £ ]\. 150.000.C00; her exports and imports had doul)led
in value. All this g(;od fortune and more Kg\i)t owed to her as-
sociation with l^ngland.
Meanwhile. President Wilson's ins|3iring reminder of the right
of small nations to self-determination had stirred Kgypt to the r|uick.
and following the armistice Sa'ad Pasha Zaghlul. a former Minister,
stepped forward to champion his country's claim. He asked leave
to discuss the grieyances i'n Pondon : for answer he was bidden
to stay at home. It moved him to defiance. He issued a stream of
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manifestoes, he called upon Europe to mark the measure of Eng-
land's iniquity. So violent grew his language that military authority
sent Zaghlul to cool his tongue in ]\Ialta. His arrest was followed
by wild disorder. Administration came to a standstill : a lust for
blood and destruction fastened on the country. In some perplex-
ity the British prime minister commissioned Lord AUenby as a spe-
cial High Commissioner first "to restore order," next "to maintain
the King's protectorate on a sure and equitable basis." The first
was easily accomplished. Rut Allenliy's triumph went no further
:
try as he would, he could not succeed in convincing Egypt of the
^•irtue of a protectorate.
Such was the situation when Lord ]\Iilner, at the head of a
commission of inquiry, arrived in Cairo. His welcome was ominous
he was bhmtlv recommended to confer with Sa'ad Zaghlul, then in
Paris, or betake himself home. Moreover Milner was handicapped
by his terms of reference : he was only empowered to discover a
form of constitution that "under the protectorate" would satisfy
Egyptian aspirations. Xo such formula could possibly be devised,
and ]\Iilner meditated U])0n a new line of approach. He met Zagh-
lul and a delegation, known later as the Wafd. in London, and
boldly proposed a treaty of alliance between the two nations with
acknowledgement of England's special interests in the valley of the
Nile. He was prepared to be generous in turn—to withdraw the
protectorate, to admit the sovereign independence of Egypt, to guar-
antee the country against aggression, to withdraw foreigners from
the administration, to confine the duty of the ]^>ritish garrison to the
])rotection of the Suez Canal. It was not enough. Egypt coveted
the Sudan also and Milner regretfully broke off negotiations.
Twelve months later Adli Pasha took u]) the thread. He was no
more successful than Zaghlul. and Lord Curzon cculd only believe
that in common with the whole world Egypt was sufl:'ering "from
the cult of disruptive and fanatical nationalism." Meanwhile Al-
lenby in Cairo was by no means at his ease. Conciliation had failed.
Negotiations had borne no better fruit and he could think of no
alternative but to ofifer Egypt her independence. Thus came about
the unilateral declaration of the 28th of February, 1922, terminat-
ing the ])rotectorate but reserving at the discretion of England
securitv of im]:)erial communications, defence of the Suez Canal,
protection of minorities and foreign interests, and the future of the
Sudan.
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Some months later came the promiili^ation of a constittiticn and
the meeting of I\evpt"s first parhament with Zaghlul as prime min-
ister. Thrtutgh the hrst session del)ate seldom wandered far from
the reserved points, and Zaghlul went to London to settle them on
'
his own terms, lie returned empty-handed, hoasting of his failure,
speaking- of England as the irreconcilahle enemy. His intemperate
words threw the country into a ferment, his attitude towards the
throne encouraged the cry ( f "rexolution or Zaghlul." Mutiny
among Egyptian troops stationed in the Sudan broke out, Sir Lee
vStack, governor general of the pro\ince, was assassinated in the
streets of Cairo. It was a srrry business: the culminating crime of
a long tale of political murders. I'unishment followed: Zaghlul hid
his face in retirement, the constitution was sus]Jende(l and parliament
was dissolved. It was well for Egypt to have a respite from demo-
cratic gc\ernment, and the new prime minister, Ziwar Pasha, waited
six months for the conntrv to recover its senses. ( )nce more the
elections went in favor of the ^^'afd. as Zaghlul's party was now uni-
versallv called, and Ziwar hardlv knew what to do. England with
some reason was suspicious of a \\'afdist ministry. Egypt would
be exposed to further mortification, if Zaghlul came back to power.
It was a dilemma from which Ziwar escaped by persuading the King
to dissolve the new parliament.
But palace rule, however benevolent in intention, is never a
satisfactory substitute for constitutional go\ernment, and it fell to
Lord Lloyd, replacing Allenby in the spring of 192.^. gentlv to re-
mind the King of that truth. It must be said of the tumultous years
which followed the declaration of independence, that His Majes-
ty Fuad the First, who succeeded to the throne in 1017, had be-
haved with gcod sense and dignity. His position was always deli-
cate and fref[uently extremely embarrassing. He had given parlia-
mentary government a trial and found it wanting: driven to the
opposite course, he found himself hedged about with constitutional
limitations ill suited to a country so backward as Egypt. Nor had
it always been easy to reconcile his concern for the true welfare of
Egypt with his duty towards her elected representatives. The two
interests frequently conflicted, and decision was often perplexing.
On this occasion the elimination of Zaghlul made the way easier,
and a new parliament met a new- leader. It was a business-like as-
sembly : party was forgotten in the interest of the State. Debate pro-
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ceeded smoothly, signiticant testimony that deputies recognized
parhamentary government was still on trial.
Taking advantage of an official visit to London, Sarwat, the new
prime minister, called on Sir Austen C"haml)erlain, minister for for-
eign altairs. He found that Englishman ready to discuss a settle-
ment <;f the reserved jujints, and out of the conversation emerged
another draft treaty, making suhstantial concession to Egyptian sen-
timent. It might have ended the ditlerences hut for an ohstinate
belief on the part of a parliament wholly W^afdist, that this party
alone must have the honor of negotiating a settlement. .Sarwat was
not a member of it: his relations with Mustapha Xahas, the suc-
cessor of Zaghlul now dead, were by no means cordial. Presently
the whisper passed that Egypt was betrayed, and fearful of forcing
an issue, Sarwat resigned. Xahas stepped into Sarwat's shoes, and
at once picked a (|uarrel with En,gland. He paid dearly for the
temerity. Chamberlain took advantage of the dispute to remind
Egypt that she must not interpret the four points reserved under the
Declaration of VJ22 as she thought fit, and Xahas, accepting the im-
plication, made way for ^lohammed Pasha Alahmoud. .Some change
was necessary in the interests of Egypt. To many Egyptians anxious
for a settlement with England, the pretensions of the Wafd had be-
come intolerable. liehind that part}- stood no doubt the bulk of the
electorate, but a parliamentary majoritv, however imjjortant in do-
mestic issues, is less so in negotiation. In that field negotiators must
have not only a sense of statesmanship but some acquaintance with
the virtue of ccm]:)romise, and there was no sign that Xahas or his
colleagues enjoyed either. Marking the moral, ^^lohammed ]\Iah-
moud prevailed on the King to suspend parliament. His term of
office was too short to acccmplish much, but he succeeded at least
in persuading England to acknowledge Egypt's paramount right
over the waters of the Blue and Wdiite Xiles. That achievement,
in itself of no small merit, passed unnoticed in the news that Mo-
hammed ]\rahmoud had wrung out of Mr. Henderson, a new foreign
minister, a treaty more favorable to Egypt than his predecessors.
There was the customary stipulation that Egyjjt must approve the
draft, and Mohammed Mahmoud returned to Cairo to prepare the
electoral rolls. It was not his good fortune to carry negotiations
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with England to the end. Tlie elections ended in an overwhelming
victory for Alustajiha Xahas, and once more ]n-ime minister, that
Egyptian went confidently to London, lie was n(~i mi re successful
than his predecessors, Sa'ad Zaghlul and Adli, had heen nine years
earlier. The Sudan was the stuml)ling hlock. ]'^g}"])t would not ahate
her claim to so\-ereignty, England could not afford to satisfy it.
Recalling the susjuMisiiui that had hefallcn earlier ])arliamcnts,
Xahas set to work to guarantee his own against a similar misfor-
tune. I'nder his auspices suspension or even moditication of the
written constitution of 1''23 hecame an act of high treason, and
punishable by a new supreme court of justice. It was too much for
the good sense of the King' to admit, and with excellent discretion
he refused his assent to the hills. The W'afd rushed on its doom ;
it swore to defend the constitution at all costs. In this wise the
issue narrowed to a contest between the throne and the ])arty. The
first picked up the challenge. Ismail Pasha Sidki formed a new
cabinet of ministers unidentified with any ])articular party, and the
King adjourned parliament indefinitely.
In vain the W^afd protested, in vain it called on Egypt to pay no
taxes : Sidki answered the defiance by proscribing all public meet-
ings of the \\'afd, confiscating its manifestoes, suspending news-
papers that dared to publish them. There were whispers of revolu-
tion, but Sidki had the armed forces of the crown at his back. Pres-
ently he was able to publish a new constitution without provoking
fresh disorder. To many Egyptians Sidki "s constitution was the nega-
tion of democratic government, the triumph of the throne at the
expense of the people. Among their number was the late prime
minister Mohammed Mahmoud, who advised the electorate to boy-
cott the coming elections. To that daring counsel Sidki answered
smoothly : he begged his adversary to reconsider the decision, he
guaranteed no interference with the polls, he s]^oke of the need of
a united nation to reopen negotiations with luigland. I'ut his un-
dertaking went no further than words. He banned a national con-
gress called by the W'afd, he ignored a declaration signed l)y four
ex-prime ministers and twenty three ex-ministers that not onlv con-
tested the validity of elections under the new constitution, but
warned England that no treaty negotiated by Sidki would l)ind
Eg\pt. Yet despite that protest, few observers conversant with
Eg\])t could doubt how the ])oll woukl go. Sixty-five ])er cent of the
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electorate were re])orte(l to have voted, and the result was a personal
triunijih for Sidki. Xone the less, considering that within the last
ei.iJjht years fcjur parliaments have sat, ten prime ministers have
held oflice. it would he rash to assume that the life of the present
parliament or of the ])resent cahinet will he long-.
Such briefly is the story of England in Egypt : a stewardship in
effect of which England has no need to be ashamed. She has nursed
her charge to adolescence, she has provided it with ideals of citi-
zenshi]) : so much at least will be admitted by posterity. The poli-
tical history of the occu])ation may be conveniently divided into
five phases. Indecision distinguished the first: England could not
hit upon a consistent policy, much less name a date when the oc-
cupation would end. That uncertainty died away, and a vague con-
^•icton that the interests of England and Egypt were permanently
indivisible replaced it. War introduced the third phase : the pro-
clamation of a protectorate followed. The fourth terminated in
admission of Egyptian sovereignty, and the fifth still awaits conclu-
sion. The Sudan remains the only obstacle now to settlement. If
occupation constitutes a title to sovereignty, then it must be admitted
that the Egyptian claim in law to the Sudan is substantial, ^^'ith the
conquest of Sennaar in 1820 by ^lohammed Ali and the annexation
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of the upper basin of the White Nile l\v Ismail fifty years later,
the Sudan passed to the keeping of Egy])t. lUit the administration
of this vast dependency proved too difficult to he successful. Mis-
government and rehellicn were a commonjilace, and in 1886 Egypt-
ian arms were forced back to W'adi Haifa. lUit that retirement did
not invalidate sovereignty, nor was the I<^gyi)tian title questioned
until the reoccupation of the Sudan in 1808. Then England, who
had partially financed the campaign and lent troops for the recon-
quest, claimed a predominant voice in the administration of the de-
pendencv. Her concern was with the Sudanese people: their welfare
she believed should take precedence of the interests of Egypt. There
have been setbacks to that ideal and doubtful adventures ; but Eng-
land can at least claim that her administratiiiu of the Sudan has
profited its inhabitants no less than herself. The foundations of self-
government have been laid, their development is assiu'ed : but un-
til the process is completed England cannot with propriety with-
draw from her task. So far no responsiI)le l\g>ptians have yet in-
dicated their intentions towards the Sudan : beyond postulating the
so\ereignty of Egypt over the whole valley r.{ the Nile, they do not
go. It is not enough : it is indeed debatable whether the ])eo]:)le of
the Sudan woidd acknowledge Egyptian rule.
Little has been said in the course of negotiation of the capitula-
tions, and the ultimate disappearance of consular courts adjudicat-
ing between their nationals has been taken for granted. lUit the
subject cannot be dismissed f|uite so cavalierly. Consular courts
are net the onlv sinners, or the only jurisdiction that is indepen-
dent of Egy])tian sovereignty. To them must be added a dozen or
more tribunals which adjudicate according to their own tradition
of practice on marriage, divorce, and inheritance. These tribunals
are Egvptian, but the law they administer is personal to the com-
munitv they re])resent. It would be well if Egypt repaired her own
legal anarchy before crying for the abolition of consular courts.
And perhaps the clamor would be less insistent but for a belief that
with the consular courts would go the capitulations. Certainly so
long as ca])itulations exist, the sovereignty of Egypt is incomplete:
more fallacious is the common belief that the Iuu-o])ean escapes
taxation from their protectiin. It is not so, nor indeed would the
foreign communitx' object in ])rincii)le to taxes on income or even
to death duties, proxided the State will not discriminate against for-
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eigners. Unhap]Mly on that pcint it feels little confidence. A su-
preme judicature international in type and eml)racin^- all existing
tribunals and procedures, might concei\al)h- furnish the guarantees
the foreign community re(|uires : hut twice in the j)ast h^gypt has
rejected that alternative, and there is no reason to believe that she
would not do so a third time.
Although taxatiiu is inelastic and amending legislation is still
cumbersome. Egv])t's financial situation is one that many countries
burdened with legacies of the war mav well envw 1 Icr ])ublic debt
stands at the modest figure of £ E. ^U .000,000, and the reserve fund
swollen with budget sur]duscs of pros])erous years eipials two fifths
of that sum. l'nha])pily its investment is less satisfactory. Cotton
is one oliender. Confronted by falling prices the State bought half
the 1928-1929 crop, and so locked u]i £ E. 1.^,000.000 of the reserve.
It was a rash adventure. The cultivator obtained no permanent re-
lief, the State became entangled in a doubtful i:])eration. The mar-
ket has not recovered, and a third of the cotton stored in the govern-
ment go-downs still awaits a purchaser. The balance of the reserve
is also heavily mortgaged. The heightening of the .Aswan dam to
hold up five milliard cubic meters of water in place of two and a
half, the ])rojected construction of a second reservoir on the White
Nile forty miles south of Khartoum, and of subsidiary barrages,
canals, and drains to distribute increased su|)plies of water, will
exhaust the lifpiid reserve. And behind expenditure on irrigation
are other commitments unrealizable and only indirectly remunera-
ti\-e: notal)ly advances to cultivators, loans to cooperative and in-
dustrial societies, generous pledges of su])port to new agricultural
and mortgage banks. Yet Eg}-])t need feel no reason to be uneasy.
Last year's accounts disclose a handsome excess of revenue over
ex])enditure and the estimates for the forthcoming twelve months
include a contribution of £ E. 5,000,000 on account of ca])ital ex-
l^enditure. l^'udent finance should show no less hapj^y results in
the future. The industr}- of the Egyptian cultixator, his courage in
facing falling prices, the stability of the climate and the fertility of
the soil are sufiicient guarantees. Xone the less there are lean years
ahead, and Egypt would be well advised to consider her administra-
tive expenditure. Economies have been made, no doubt, but there
is still ample room for further and more drastic cuts.
Within the past twelve years on five separate occasions Eng-
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land has endeavored to settle her differences with Egypt, and has
failed. It is true that a gONernment more stable in appearance than
its predecessors holds office today in Egypt : but the country, never-
theless, is torn with faction and dispute, and until political parties
lay aside their ri\'alries and approach England as a united nation,
it may be wiser to wait on time. Yet if the future is uncertain, at
least England can look back on the ])ast with humble satisfaction.
Eler achievement in Egypt cannot be undone. The superstructure
she has been at pains to build, may shake from time to time, but
the foundations will not move. They are laid too well.
